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Eavesdropping On the Compromising Emanations of Electronic
Equipment: The Laws of England and the United States
We in this country, in this generation, are - by destiny rather than
choice - the watchmen on the walls of world freedom. 1
INTRODUCTION
For less than two hundred dollars it is possible to see what someone is
typing on their computer screen from several hundred yards away.
The device that makes this possible can be built from easily-available
parts for under two hundred dollars. The device is passive and does not
require the placement of a listening device in or near the screen. There
is little chance of detection or apprehension. Although the Government
has acted to prevent dissemination of technical data related to these de-
vices, schematics are available from the computer underground. The
Government's efforts have served only to limit the availability of counter-
measures, rather than to prevent the device's use. Except for military
activities handling national security information, few computer sites are
protected from this type of surveillance. The ease with which this tech-
nology may be implemented, coupled with the impossibility of detection
and the lack of adequate counter-measures, make it the perfect computer
surveillance technique. It is already becoming the method of choice for
hackers.
Before the advent of modem technology, spying was performed in
person. To overhear a conversation the eavesdropper had to be within
listening range. This is no longer true.2 By the mid-twentieth century
electronic surveillance devices were commonplace.3 Today, technologies
whose mere existence was once a closely-guarded secret are discussed
openly in the print media.' Society has grown accustomed to the exist-
I Undelivered speech of President John F. Kennedy, Dallas Citizens Council 35-36 (Nov. 22,
1963).
2 S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS
2112, 2154.
3 Examples include hidden microphones and video cameras as well as more esoteric devices
such as spread spectrum transmitters. See generally, D. POLLOCK, METHODS OF ELECTRONIC Au-
DIO SURVEILLANCE (1973) (surveillance measures and counter-measures).
4 Compare Broad, Every Computer 'Whispers'Its Secrets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1983, at C-1 col.
2 (TEMPEST openly discussed) with NACS1 4003 Annex C (word TEMPEST deleted during redac-
tion). See infra, note 13, for discussion of TEMPEST.
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ence of these devices. The use of surveillance devices against criminals,
foreign agents, and even ordinary citizens is well-publicized.5
Computers have become commonplace. They are used in business
and at home. Many computers have software designed to prevent unau-
thorized use and unauthorized access to information.6 These computers
are still not secure. The information they contain may be obtained
through electronic surveillance.
In the past, the communication lines of a computer would be tapped
and information obtained as it transits the line.7 Today, eavesdroppers
can intercept the electromagnetic radiation emitted by computers and
their peripherals.' The radiation may be picked up from cables, or pas-
sively as it moves through the aether.?
This technology has made Justice Brandeis, prophecy a reality
"[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from se-
cret drawers, can reproduce them in court. . .. "10
This note will explore the legality of this type of emanations surveil-
lance in the United States and England. It will deal specifically with the
legality of individuals using such surveillance to eavesdrop on the emana-
tions of electronic equipment. Prohibitions and limitations on its use by
governments, their agents, and employees will be examined only as each
intersects the main topic.
The first section is an introduction to compromising emanations. It
includes a discussion of how compromising emanations are used to ob-
tain information, and how special equipment. limits these emanations.
The topic of compromising emanations is considered classified by the
United States Government. Several of the documents used were classi-
fied and were only released to the author under a Freedom of Informa-
5 See generally D. MARTIN, WILDERNESS OF MIRRORS (1980) (detailed accounts of CIA and
KGB counter-intelligence operations); J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT OF
AMERICA'S MOST SECRET INSIDE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (1982) (detailed discussion
of the National Security Agency, its organization and activities).
6 See generally DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA (1985) (setting forth a uniform set
of requirements and classes for assessing the effectiveness of computer software security).
For a discussion of the Internet worm and counter-worm activities see generally D. SEELEY, A
TOUR OF THE WORM (1988); M. EICHIN & J. ROCHLIS, WITH MICROSCOPE AND TWEEZERS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNET VIRUS OF NOVEMBER 1988 (1988); E. SPAFFORD, THE INTERNET
WORM PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS (1988).
7 See D. POLLOCK, supra note 3, at 216-30.
8 See infra, note 28 and accompanying text.
9 Broad, supra note 4.
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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tion Act Request. Although heavily sanitized, these documents contain
information never before available.
Section Two examines U.S. law as it relates to this technology. Sec-
tion Three discusses English law, and why English law has succeeded
where U.S. law has failed. The final section explores possible solutions
and sets forth recommendations to address this problem. The reader is
reminded that the law routinely lags behind technology. Only through
technology can technological problems be solved.
Appendix A contains the text of a memorandum (previously classi-
fied top secret) from President Harry S. Truman to the Secretary of State
and Secretary of Defense regarding the communications intelligence ac-
tivities of the United States. This memo created the National Security
Agency. Appendix B is an Introduction to Compromising Emanations
explaining the current technology in the electronic intelligence area.
It is possible to intercept the compromising emanations of electronic
equipment. A compromising emanation is one that will yield useful in-
formation when analyzed. Both electromagnetic radiation and signals
that escape through cables can be considered emanations. The technique
of electronic intelligence gathering using the compromising emanations
of target equipment will be referred to as ELINT/CE in this note. 1 The
use of ELINT/CE is not illegal under the laws of the United States or
England.
In the United States the possession of computer equipment that does
not emit compromising emanations is limited to the U.S. Government
and government contractors utilizing national security information.12
This leads to the conundrum that it is legal for individuals and the gov-
ernment to invade the privacy of others, but illegal for individuals to take
steps to protect their privacy.
The author suggests that the solution is straightforward. The gov-
ernment has a standard for limiting compromising emanations. The
standard, known as TEMPEST,"3 is set forth in NACSIM 5100AI4 and
I 1 The actual short name used by the National Security Agency to refer to ELINT/CE has not
been released. We will use our own short name: ELINT/CE. ELINT is the acronym for ELec-
tronic INTelligence and CE is the acronym for Compromising Emanations. For a more detailed
introduction to compromising emanations the reader is directed to Appendix B.
12 A contract is signed when the contractor is approved for access to TEMPEST information.
Releasing the equipment is a violation of the contract. Further, releasing the equipment is tanta-
mount to selling secrets since the design techniques are secret. A contractor would therefore be
liable under any number of unspecified laws ranging from treason to export violations.
13 TEMPEST is an unclassified short name referring to investigations and studies of compro-
mising emanations. It is sometimes used as a synonym for 'compromising emanations.' DEFENSE
COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
(ADP) SYSTEMS, DCA Instruction No. 630-230-19, at A-5 (1985) [ADP SECURITY].
14 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM (NACSIM) 5100A: COMPROMISING EMANATIONS LABORATORY TEST REQUIRE-
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is not available to the public. 15 The only way to prevent this type of
eavesdropping is through the use of equipment meeting TEMPEST stan-
dards. Such equipment is referred to as TEMPEST Certified.
To promote general use and availability of TEMPEST Certified
equipment, information on protecting privacy under TEMPEST should
be made freely available. TEMPEST Certified equipment should be le-
gally available. All computer equipment should be labeled with its ema-
nations profile, and whether it meets the TEMPEST spectral limits.
To promote the protection of personal information, a tort should be
created against data bureaus that fail to take reasonable precautions in
protecting personal data. Should a data bureau fail to adequately protect
such information, the person to whom the data relates would have a
cause of action against the bureau. This will encourage those who hold
the information of others to protect that data.
I. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
The Transition from HUMINT to ELINT
Spying is divided by professionals into two main types: human intel-
ligence gathering (HUMINT) and electronic intelligence gathering
(ELINT). As the names imply, HUMINT relies on human operatives,
and ELINT relies on technological operatives. For centuries HUMINT
was the sole method for collecting intelligence.16 The HUMINT opera-
tive would steal important papers, observe troop and weapon move-
ments,17 lure people into his confidences to extract secrets, and stand
MENTS, ELECTROMAGNETICS (1981)[hereinafter NACSIM 5100A] (supersedes National Communi-
cations Security/Emanations Security Information (NACSEM) 5100).
15 Unclassified information concerning compromising emanations shall not be discussed or
made available to persons without a need-to-know, especially when the aggregate of unclas-
sified information could be combined to reveal classified information. No person is entitled
to knowledge or possession of, or access to, information concerning compromising emana-
tions solely because of his office, position or type of clearance. No information related to
compromising emanations shall be released for public consumption through the press, ad-
vertising, radio, TV or other public media.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY INFORMATION (NACSI)
4003: CLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES FOR COMSEC INFORMATION at C-2 (1978)thereinafter
NASCI 4003].
16 HUMINT has been used by the United States since the Revolution. CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 9 (1976).
The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged - All
that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For
upon Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are
generally defeated, however well planned & promising a favorable issue.
Id. at preface (citing Letter of George Washington (July 26, 1777)).
17 I wish you to take every possible pains in your powers, by sending trusty persons to
Staten Island in whom you can confide, to obtain Intelligence of the Enemy's situation &
numbers - what kind of Troops they are, and what Guards they have - their strength &
where posted.
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under the eavesdrip 8 of houses, eavesdropping on the occupants.
As technology has progressed, tasks that once could only be per-
formed by humans have been taken over by machines. Spying has also
become automated. Modem satellite technology allows troop and weap-
ons movements to be observed with greater precision and from greater
distances than a human spy could ever hope to accomplish. 19 The theft
of documents and eavesdropping on conversations may now be per-
formed electronically. This means greater safety for the human opera-
tive, whose only involvement may be the placing of the initial ELINT
devices. This has led to the ascendancy of ELINT over HUMINT be-
cause the placement and monitoring of ELINT devices may be per-
formed by a technician who has no training in the art of spying. The
gathered intelligence may be processed by an intelligence expert, perhaps
thousands of miles away, with no need of field experience. 20
ELINT has a number of other advantages over HUMINT. If a spy
is caught, her existence could embarrass the employing state and she
could be forced into giving up the identities of her compatriots or other
important information. By its very nature, a discovered ELINT device
cannot give up any information; the ubiquitous nature of bugs provides
the principal state with the ability to plausibly deny ownership or
involvement. 21
Trespassatory ELINT versus Passive ELINT
ELINT devices (bugs) fall into two broad categories: trespassatory
and non-trespassatory. Trespassatory bugs require some type of trespass
in order for them to function. A transmitter might require the physical
invasion of the target premises for placement, or a microphone might be
surreptitiously attached to the outside of a window. A telephone trans-
mitter can be placed anywhere on the phone line, including at the central
switch. Trespass occurs either when the device is physically attached to
the phone line, or if inductive, when placed in close proximity to the
phone line.22 Even microwave bugs require the placement of a resonator
Id
I8 Eavesdrip is an Anglo-Saxon word, and refers to the wide overhanging eaves used to prevent
rain from falling close to a house's foundation. The eavesdrip provided "a sheltered place where one
could hide to listen clandestinely to conversation within the house." W. MORRIS & M. MORRIS,
MoRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS 198 (lst ed. 1977).
19 Blair, Reconnaissance Satellites in OUTER SPACE: A NEW DIMENSION OF THE ARMS RACE
125 (B. Jasani ed. 1982); Smith, Evolution of the Soviet Space Program from Sputnik to Salyut and
Beyond, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF SPACE 295 (1984).
20 See generally BAMFORD, supra note 5.
21 Id.
22 See generally D. POLLOCK, supra note 3, at 216, 226.
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cone within the target premises.23
Non-trespassatory (passive) ELINT devices operate by receiving
electromagnetic radiation (EMR) as it radiates through the aether, and
do not require the placement of bugs. Methods include the interception24
of information transmitted by satellite, microwave, and radio, including
mobile and cellular phone transmissions. This information is purpose-
fully transmitted with the intent that some intended person or persons
would receive it.25
Non-trespassatory ELINT also includes the interception of informa-
tion that was never intended to be transmitted. All electronic devices
emit electromagnetic radiation. Some of the radiation, as with radio
waves, is intended to transmit information. Much of this radiation is not
intended to transmit information and is merely incidental to whatever
work the target device is performing. This information can be inter-
cepted and reconstructed into a coherent form.
Introduction to Compromising Emanations26
According to the National Security Agency27 (NSA), "information
... which is generated, processed, or transferred by electrical, electronic,
and electromechanical equipments is subject to compromise because of
unintentional electromagnetic radiated and conducted emanations."2
These "[c]ompromising emanations [CE] are unintentional intelligence-
bearing signals which, if intercepted and analyzed, disclose... informa-
tion transmitted, received, handled, or otherwise processed by any infor-
23 Pursglove, How Russian Spy Radios Work, Radio Electronics, Jan. 1962, at 89-91.
24 Interception is an espionage term of art and should be differentiated from its more common
usage. When information is intercepted, the interceptor as well as the intended recipient receive the
information. Interception when not used as a term of art refers to one person receiving something
intended for someone else; the intended recipient never receives what he was intended to receive.
25 For example, when you make a phone call you intend for the recipient of that call to be able
to hear your voice. It is your intent to communicate some information. Even though you may not
know the exact route your call will take (wire, microwave, fiber, or satellite) you are transmitting
information with the intent that at some time some authorized person will receive this information,
your phone call.
When you type on your computer it is not your intention that what you are typing be transmit-
ted to the surrounding neighborhood. If your computer is not TEMPEST Certified it is transmitting
this information, though you did not intend for this to happen.
26 For a more technical discussion of the subject see Appendix B
27 The National Security Agency is charged with protecting United States government com-
munications and intercepting the communications of other nations. Memorandum from President
Harry S. Truman to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Oct. 24, 1952) (establishing
the National Security Agency). This memorandum, never before released to the public in its en-
tirety, is set out in Appendix A.
28 NACSIM 5100A, supra note 14, at iii.
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mation-processing equipment."2 9
Intercepting the compromising emanations from electronic equip-
ment is referred to as ELINT/CE.30 The term ELINT/CE does not
describe one particular circuit, or even one particular interception tech-
nique. Instead, it encompasses the range of all ELINT devices that
eavesdrop on compromising emanations.
With current ELINT/CE technology it is possible to reconstruct the
contents of computer video display unit (VDU) screens from up to one
kilometer away; reconstructing the contents of a computer's memory or
the contents of its mass storage devices is more complicated and must be
performed from a smaller distance.
The reconstruction of information from CE is not limited to com-
puters and digital devices but is applicable to all electronic devices.31
However, ELINT/CE is especially effective against VDUs because they
produce a very high level of electromagnetic radiation which may be re-
ceived without expensive amplifiers or antennas.32 The circuit necessary
to eavesdrop on a VDU is simple to build. Circuit diagrams are available
from the computer underground; the parts may be purchased from any
electronics dealer for less than two-hundred dollars.
Emanations which cannot be detected cannot be analyzed to obtain
information; they are therefore not a security threat.33 An item of equip-
ment that gives off very low emanations is secure against this form of
eavesdropping.
The NSA has established an emanations standard for electrical
equipment. Equipment whose emanations are below the levels set by this
standard are considered secure against this form of eavesdropping. The
document setting forth this standard is NACSIM 5100A. 34
Equipment that is tested and certified as conforming to NACSIM
29 Id. at 2-1.
In laymen's terms, compromising emanations are signals that will yield information when ana-
lyzed. To over-simplify, if an electronic typewriter emanates a specific signal when the "A" key is
pressed, and emanates another specific signal when the "B" key is pressed, and so forth for all the
keys, then these emanations are compromising because a circuit designed to eavesdrop on electronic
typewriters would be able to determine what was being typed. The information typed on the type-
writer would be compromised by the typewriter's emanations.
30 See supra, note 11, for the definition of ELINT/CE.
31 J. Schultz, Defeating Ivan with TEMPEST, in C31 HANDBOOK: COMMAND CONTROL COM-
MUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE 181 (Defense Electronics Ist ed. 1986).
32 For a thorough discussion of VDU ELINT/CE see Van Eck, Electromagnetic Radiation
from Video Display unit An Eavesdropping Risk?, 4 COMPUTERS & SEcuarny 269 (1985).
33 Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm... in the form of
... disclosure... of data. A threat is a potential for harm. The presence of a threat does
not mean that it will necessarily cause actual harm. Threats exist because of the very
existence of the system or activity and not because of any specific weakness.
ADP SECuRiTY, supra note 13, at A-14.
34 "Equipment meeting the limits (set forth in NACSIM 5100A) provide an acceptable degree
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5100A is referred to as TEMPEST certified equipment. Producing
TEMPEST Certified equipment is expensive; to encourage the availabil-
ity of off-the-shelf TEMPEST Certified equipment the NSA maintains a
list of equipment that is TEMPEST certified. When a government
agency or activity requires TEMPEST Certified equipment they may
purchase directly from this list rather than contracting to have the equip-
ment redesigned to meet NACSIM 5100A.35
Information regarding compromising emanations is restricted.3 6
The information is available strictly on a need-to-know basis.
Unclassified information concerning compromising emanations shall
not be discussed or made available to persons without a need-to-know,
especially when the aggregate of unclassified information could be
combined to reveal classified information. No person is entitled to
knowledge or possession of, or access to, information concerning com-
promising emanations solely because of his office, position or type of
clearance.37
Limited information is available to firms producing TEMPEST
equipment for the government. These firms must be owned by U.S. citi-
zens and pass a review by the Defense Investigation Service.38 Contrac-
tors are required to submit to prepublication review.39 In addition, they
of conducted and radiated (emanations) security at the equipment level." NACSIM 5100A, supra
note 14, at 2-1.
35 Shearin, TEMPEST: Let's Do More Than Talk About It, J. ELECTRONIC DEF., Apr. 1985,
at 55. In 1985, Mr. Shearin was the Executive Manager for TEMPEST Security Engineering at the
National Security Agency.
36 NACSI 4003, supra note 15, at C-1, C-2.
37 Id. at C-2.
38 Shearin, supra note 35, at 55.
39 All TEMPEST assistance is rendered by the contracting agency, including technical
support and the prepublication review of any proposed dissemination of TEMPEST infor-
mation. The control and distribution of classified TEMPEST information is a contractual
requirement.
Id.
For a discussion of prior restraint and national security as they relate to the First Amendment,
see United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), reh'g. denied, 486 F.
Supp. 5, motion denied, 443 U.S. 709 (mandamus), motion denied, 5 Media L.R. (7th Cir.), dis-
missed without op., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.) (magazine intended to publish plans for nuclear weapon;
prior restraint injunction issued), see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(per curium) (Pentagon Papers case: setting forth prior restraint standard which government was
unable to meet).
For a general discussion of the First Amendment and national security, see T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Cheh, Government Control of Private Ideas - Strik-
ing a Balance Between Scientific Freedom and National Security, 23 JURIMETRicS J. 1 (1982) (con-
cluding "[c]urrent laws and regulations limiting scientific and technical expression" exceed the
legitimate needs of national security); M. Feldman, Why the First Amendment Is Not Incompatible
With National Security Interest: Maintaining a Constitutional Perspective, in THE HERITAGE LEC-
TURES 90 (1987). Cf Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1
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are discouraged from discussing TEMPEST with anyone, especially the
press.40
Even the document defining the TEMPEST standards is restricted.
NACSIM 5100A is considered COMSEC material; access by contractor
personnel is therefore limited to U.S. citizens holding final government
clearances.4 NACSIM 5100A may not be "disclosed or released by any
holder without approval of the Director, NSA [or the] Chief, CSS [(Cen-
tral Security Service)]."'42 Nor may it be released to foreign nationals
without "PRIOR SPECIFIC APPROVAL FROM THE DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. '43
This virtual press blackout has left the public completely unaware of
compromising emanations or how to protect against them. Even public
sector computer security managers are unaware of how simple it is to
build a ELINT/CE device. If the public is completely unaware of the
threat they are effectively prevented from acting to stop it. Security man-
agers are blissfully unaware that their computer security is being under-
mined by compromising emanations. The public is unable to form an
opinion, let alone lobby their elected representatives for a solution.
Even if the public was aware, they are prevented from acting to limit
their compromising emanations. TEMPEST equipment is not available
to the public. It is available only to government agencies that can
demonstrate a definite security need.4 The only way to prevent emana-
tions is with TEMPEST equipment. If the public is denied this equip-
ment, they can not act to defend themselves.
The lack of information is more dangerous than the restriction on
owning TEMPEST equipment because the public does not even know
they are at risk. If they knew they were at risk but were denied TEM-
PEST certified equipment, they could at least take the minor precaution
(1971) (First Amendment applies only to political speech) with Lewy, Can Democracy Keep Secrets,
26 POL. REv. 17 (1983) (endorsing draconian secrecy laws mirroring the English system).
40 "[Wle are very sensitive to TEMPEST exposure in the media, educational seminars, or in-
dustrial trade shows... We must continue to work toward... ensuring the inviolability of [TEM-
PEST information]. Shearin, supra note 35, at 75.
"[Vie challenge both Government and industry to restrict TEMPEST inquiries and informa-
tion to established classified channels." Id. at 55.
"No information related to compromising emanations shall be released for public consumption
through the press, advertising, radio, TV or other public media." NACS1 4003, supra note 15, at C-
2.
41 NACSIM 5100 A., supra note 14, at title page.
42 Id.
43 Id. at i (emphasis in original).
44 The Drug Enforcement Agency was able to demonstrate such a need when "major drug
smugglers" mastered ELINT/CE. TEMPEST Market Lolls in Doldrums, 5 ADVANCED MILITARY
COMPUTING, July 17, 1989, at 1.
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of not storing sensitive information on a computer system."
II. UNITED STATES LAW
The Communications Act of 1934
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 19346 (1934 Act) was
intended to criminalize the unauthorized interception of wire and radio
communications. 7 In 1968, section 605 was amended4" to shift control
of wire communications to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.41 Section 605 is now primarily limited to the
interception of radio and television communications. However, the sec-
tion still prohibits communications workers from intercepting and di-
vulging communications to unauthorized persons.
Section 605 as amended explicitly allows the public to intercept pub-
lic broadcast transmissions:
[Section 605] shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or
utilizing the contents of any radio communication which is transmitted
by a station for the use of the general public, which relates to ships,
aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress, or which is transmitted by an
amateur radio station or by a citizens band radio operator.50
The Section specifically prohibits the interception and divulging of
radio or wire transmissions by unauthorized persons. No communica-
tions worker may "divulge or publish ' 51 the "existence, contents, sub-
stance, purpose, effect, or meaning' 52 of a radio or wire communications
to anyone but authorized persons. Authorized persons include:
(1) "the addressee, his agent, or attorney," 53
(2) "a person employed or authorized to forward such communication
45 Not storing important information on a computer is an oft overlooked security technique.
Although rarely used, it is the best possible security precaution because no computer is completely
secure. In fact, taking the realities of computer security into account, the only secure computer is a
mason's brick. You cannot get any information into it and therefore miscreants cannot get informa-
tion back out.
46 47 U.S.C.S. § 605 (Law. Co-op. 1962).
47 The single largest violator of the Act was the U.S. Government, under Operation Shamrock.
From September 1, 1945 through May 15, 1975 the U.S. Government received copies of all the cable
traffic entering or leaving the United States. The cables were provided to the National Security
Agency and its predecessor, the Signals Security Agency, for thirty years. The Government received
complete cooperation from ITT Communications (now ITT World Communications), Western
Union Telegraph Company, and RCA Communications (now RCA Global). BAMFORD, supra note
5, at 302-05.
48 Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
49 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
50 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1982).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
ol. 2 :359
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to its destination, ',54
(3) "proper accounting or distributing officers of the various commu-
nicating centers over which the communication may be passed,"
55
or
(4) "to the master of a ship under whom [the communications worker]
is serving.",
56
The communications worker may also divulge the message or infor-
mation about the message "in response to a subpoena issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or... on demand of other lawful authority. " 57
Further, unauthorized individuals are prohibited from intercepting
any radio communication using the message, or any information con-
tained therein58 for his own benefit, or the benefit of another.59 Unau-
thorized individuals are also prohibited from interception radio
communication and divulge[ing] or publish[ing] ° the existence, contents,
substance, purpose, effect, or meaning61 of the message.
The Act was intended to criminalize surveillance techniques as they
were known in 1934. It is impossible to tell if the act had its intended
effect. It is in fact impossible to tell if most laws have their intended
effect because successful criminals do not get caught. This is especially
true for information crimes like surveillance. With surveillance, nothing
is stolen except privacy. The parties to an eavesdropped conversation are
unaware of the eavesdropping. Unless the parties actively seek out and
locate the eavesdropping devices, they will never know they are being
eavesdropped on. Sophisticated eavesdropping equipment is almost im-
possible to detect. Passive equipment is impossible to detect; the only
method of prevention is the use of counter-measures to prevent intercep-
tion. A successful eavesdropper is never detected. Therefore, the Act
would only effect those who were so clumsy as to be caught.
Information on whether the U.S. government had mastered
ELINT/CE in 1934 is secret. Even though ELINT/CE is used mainly
against VDUs, it is also used in combination with an trespassatory tap to
intercept wire communications. It was used in this manner in the Berlin
Tunnel in 1954.62 It is possible that this technique was in its infancy
when the 1934 Act was drafted. For whatever reasons, Congress made
no mention of it in the legislative history and it is not covered by the Act.
54 Id.
55 IdL
56 Id
57 Id
58 Id'
59 Id
60 Id
61 Id
62 D. MARTIN, supra note 5, at 75-76 (1980).
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The Act's failure to cover ELINT/CE is not a problem because
making ELINT/CE illegal would not prevent its use. Assuming argu-
endo that ELINT/CE were criminalized, what then? How would
ELINT/CE malefactors be caught? The answer is they would not be.
ELINT/CE is completely passive. There are no tell-tale signs that it is
being used, nor does the person under surveillance receive any indication
she is being surveilled. Unlike trespassatory ELINT devices,,
ELINT/CE does not require the entry and surreptitious placement of the
device in the premises under surveillance. There is, therefore, no chance
of the ELINT/CE malefactor being caught in the act of placing the bug.
Nor is there any chance of his use of the ELINT/CE device being de-
tected. There is, therefore, no possible way in which the ELINT/CE
malefactor can be caught.
If the malefactor cannot be caught, then why have a law? It could
be argued that making it illegal would discourage people from using
ELINT/CE. Unfortunately, this is short-sighted. Perhaps the very
timid would be dissuaded. Considering how unlikely it is that the
ELINT/CE malefactor would be caught it is hard to argue that anyone
would be scared off by an unenforceable law.
To explore the ramifications of Section 605 fully, four hypotheticals
will be used.
Hypothetical One. D1 eavesdrops on V's conversations by planting
a small radio transmitter on V's office. This would be not be a criminal
act under section 605. Section 605 is limited to wire and radio communi-
cations, but in this case V was not intending to communicate by radio so
the interception falls outside the Act.63
Hypothetical Two. D2 listens to V's phone conversation by physi-
cally tapping the wires of a common carrier. This would be a criminal
act under section 605 as originally codified. D2 has intercepted a wire
communication within the definition in the section.6 However, this
would not be a violation of section 605 as amended because control of
wire communications has been switched to Title III.
Hypothetical Three. D3 uses a radio receiver to listen passively in
on a private radio transmission. He overhears private information ex-
changed between a politician and his mistress. D3 sells this information
to the National Enquirer. This would be a criminal act under section 605
which makes it a crime for any "person having received or intercepted
63 Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (undercover agent wearing hidden microphone
and transmitter did not violate section 605 since other person conversation was transmitted was not
using a Section 605 communication system); United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 921 (D.C.N.Y.
1950) (evidence gathered by police Detectaphone admissible since there was no wire or radio com-
munication involved).
64 See Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480
(D.C. cir. 1953), aff'd, 219 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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radio communication... [to] divulge or publish the... contents... of
such communication .. "65
D3's act is criminalized even though it is passive. However, the Act
adds the requirement of personal profit. This serves two purposes. First,
it does not penalize amateur radio enthusiasts, or emergency personnel,
who may accidentally intercept a private communication while tuning
for a legitimate transmission. Second, it limits sanctions to instances
where there has been some type of overt, non-passive act. Had D3
merely listened, but not acted, he would not have been detected. It was
his overt act that led to his demise.
Hypothetical Four. D4 uses ELINT/CE to eavesdrop on the word
processor belonging to the senior partner in a mergers and acquisitions
firm. He uses this information to invest in the stock market.66 D4 has
committed no crime under the Act. The information was not transmit-
ted via wire as criminalized in the original version of the Act. Neither
was the information transmitted by radio. It therefore falls outside the
Act.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
The Communications Act of 1934 was not satisfactory67 because
technology had outstripped the law68 and the Supreme Court had pro-
hibited warranted searches of Section 605 communication. 69 Accord-
ingly, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 and
introduced Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.70 Title III was designed to restore communications privacy.71
It had as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
65 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1982). See also Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.
1987).
66 For the sake of simplicity we will ignore applicable security and exchange laws.
67 Both proponents and opponents of wiretapping and electronic surveillance agreed that the
then present state of the law in this area was extremely unsatisfactory and that the Congress should
act to clarify the resulting confusion. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2154.
68 Id at 2154-60.
69 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
70 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) (hereinafter [Title III].
Title III is essentially a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception Act... and
S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1967... Subsequent to the introduc-
tion of S. 675, the U.S. Supreme Court, on June 12, 1967, handed down the decision in
Berger v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 338 U.S. 41, which declared unconstitutional the New
York statute authorizing electronic eavesdropping (bugging) by law-enforcement officers in
investigating certain types of crimes. The Court held that the New York stature on its
face, failed to meet certain constitutional standards. In the course of the opinion, the
Court delineated the constitutional criteria that electronic surveillance legislation should
contain. Title III was drafted to meet these standards and to conform with Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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communications,7 2 and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circum-
stances and conditions under which the interpretation of wire and oral
communications may be authorized.73
Section 2511 of Title III prohibits the interception,74 use, 75 or dis-
closure76 of any wire or oral communication. Interception is the aural
acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication, through
the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." Violators are
subject to criminal7" and civil penalties.79
A wire communication is any communication made on wire or cable
provided by a common carrier.8" Wire communication is protected even
if partially transmitted by microwave or satellite.8 1
The protection of oral communication is specifically limited to situa-
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., REPRINTED IN 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
2153.
71 The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken place in the
last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveil-
lance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of communication is seriously
jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance. Commercial and employer-labor espio-
nage is becoming widespread. It is becoming increasingly difficult to conduct business
meetings in private. Trade secrets are betrayed. Labor and management plans are re-
vealed. No longer is it possible, in short for each man to retreat into his home and be left
alone.
Id. at 2154.
72 Virtually all concede that the use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance techniques by
private unauthorized hands has little justification where communications are intercepted
without the consent of one of the participants.
Id at 2156.
73 Id. at 2153.
74 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(a) (1970).
75 Id. at § 2511(l)(d).
76 Id. at § 2511(l)(c).
77 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970). See also Application of the United States for an Order Author-
izing Installation & Use of a Pen Register, 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1008
(1978) (what cannot be heard falls outside the aural acquisition prohibition); United States v.
Senditz, 589 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1978) (aural acquisition does not
include computer transmissions).
78 Violators shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1970).
79 Civil damages include actual damages (minimum $1000), punitive damages, and reasonable
attorney and litigation costs. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
80 [w]ire communication means any communication made in whole or in part through the
use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated
by any person engaged as a common carriers in providing or operating such facilities for
the transmission of interstate or foreign communications.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1970).
81 United States v. Gregg, 629 F. Supp. 958, 963 (W.D. Mo. 1986) aff'd, 829 F.2d 1430 (10th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir.
1975).
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tions where there is a justified expectation of privacy.82 The expectation
of privacy test has been established in a series of Supreme Court cases
defining the relation between the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment83 and government's use of electronic surveillance devices."
The exact definition of reasonable expectation of privacy is still a
mystery today. Professor Katz argues that the Supreme Court has whit-
tled the expectation of privacy doctrine down to the nub. 5 According to
Katz there is no expectation of privacy for anything other than oral
communication. 8
6
Warranted searches, foreign intelligence warrantless searches, 7 and
82 "[O]ral communication means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1970).
83 The righf of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, support by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
84 In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927), the Supreme Court held that warrantless
wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because it was not a search of a physical
premises and did not seize anything tangible. Id at 464.
Forty years later, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court held that
warrantless wiretapping was an unreasonable search and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment.
See also Berger v. New York, 389 U.S. 41 (1967) (capturing conversation with an eavesdropping
device is a search under the Fourth Amendment). Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)
(recording of oral statements is a seizure). Under Katz, the Fourth Amendment is violated where
the individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 389 U.S. at 360.
85 Katz, In Search of A Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. LJ. 549
(1990).
86 Id. at 555.
87 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(1970). It was never the intention of Congress to limit the Executive
branch's ability to surveil foreign nationals, both at home and abroad:
It is obvious that whatever means are necessary should and must be taken to protect the
national interest. Wiretapping and electronic surveillance techniques are proper means for
the acquisition of counterintelligence against the hostile action of foreign powers. Nothing
in the proposed legislation seeks to disturb the power of the President to act in this area.
Limitations that may be deemed proper in the field of domestic affairs of a nation become
artificial when international relations and internal security are at stake.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
2157.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) has expanded upon Title III's blanket
permission for foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence gathering within the United States. 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982). See also S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in, 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIiN. NEWS 3904.
A detailed discussion of the FISA is beyond the scope of this work. For a more detailed discus-
sion see Brown & Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches For Foreign Intelligence Purposes"
Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 97 (1985); Cinquegrana,
The Walls (and H, re) Have Ears The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PENN. L. REv. 793 (1989); Giesy, Jurisdictional Limitations on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 8 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 259 (1984); Kornblum,
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line monitoring for diagnosis and repair" are specifically excluded from
section 2511's prohibitions. Section 2512 prohibits the sale, manufac-
ture, or advertisement of eavesdropping devices.8 9 Common carriers,
their agents and employees, acting within the normal course of business
are excluded, 90 as are government employees and persons acting under
contract with the government.9"
Title III successfully updated anti-surveillance law to match the sur-
veillance technology of 1968. However, there is no reference to
ELINT/CE in its history and Title III does not cover ELINT/CE. As
with the 1934 Act there is no information available as to whether this
was omission or commission.
To explore fully the ramifications of Title III, the four previous hy-
potheticals will be used, as well as one new hypothetical.
Hypothetical One. D1 eavesdrops on V's conversations by planting
a small radio transmitter on V's office. This would be a criminal act
under section 251 l(1)(a) which criminalizes the interception of oral com-
munication. Under 2510(2) the oral communication must have an expec-
tation of privacy. Since V's conversations took place within V's private
office, D I has intercepted an oral communication where there was a valid
expectation of privacy.
Hypothetical Two. D2 listens to V's phone conversation by physi-
cally tapping the wires of a common carrier. This would be a criminal
act under section 251 l(l)(a), criminalizing the interception of wire com-
munications. Under 2510(1) wire communication includes only wires be-
longing to a common carrier. D2 has intercepted the V's wire
communication using a common carrier.
Hypothetical Three. D3 uses a radio receiver to listen passively in
on a private radio transmission. He overhears private information ex-
changed between a politician and his mistress. D3 sells this information
to the National Enquirer. This would not be a criminal act under Title
III because radio transmissions do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.9 2 It is criminalized under the 1934 Act.9 3
Hypothetical Four. D4 uses ELINT/CE to eavesdrop on the word
America's Secret Court: Listening In On Espionage and Terrorism, 24 JuDGES J., Summer 1985, at
14 (1985); Saltzburg, National Security and Privacy: Of Governments and Individuals Under the Con-
stitution and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 28 VA. J. oF INT'L. L. 129 (1987).
88 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (1970).
89 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1) (1970). See United States v. Pritchard, 773 F.2d 873 (7th Cit. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085 (1986) (illegal possession of wiretap); United States v. Bast, 495 F.2d 138
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (possession, distribution, and advertisement of wiretaps).
90 18 U.S.C. § 2512(2)(a) (1970).
91 18 U.S.C. § 2512(2)(b) (1970).
92 United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23 (Ist Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
93 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (hypothetical three).
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processor belonging to the senior partner in a mergers and acquisitions
firm. He uses this information to invest in the stock market. 94 D4 has
committed no crime under Title III. The information was not transmit-
ted via a common carrier. Neither was the information transmitted by
radio. It therefore falls outside the scope of Title III.
Hypothetical Five. D5 listens to the information transmitted be-
tween two computers by physically tapping the wires of a common car-
rier. This is not a criminal act because Title III only extends to aural
communication and computer communication is not considered aural.95
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 198696 amended Ti-
tle III to include non-wire communication. The Act was designed to
update Title III and bring it in line with current technologies. The Act
was specifically designed to include electronic mail, inter-computer com-
munications, and cellular telephones while excluding cordless
telephones.97
The Act did not modify the main concerns of Title III: protecting
conversations and telecommunications.98 It merely updated Title III to
match current technology.99 An effort was made to phrase the amend-
ments in broad enough terms that they would cover future advances in
telecommunications technology.
As before, ELINT/CE was excluded from the Act and its history.
By 1986, however, the NSA was using ELINT/CE and had a counter-
measures program in place. Either the NSA had not informed Congress
of its TEMPEST program and Congress failed to criminalize
ELINT/CE through ignorance, or Congress intentionally chose not to
criminalize it. In either case ELINT/CE was not, and has not, been
criminalized.
No American author has suggested that ELINT/CE be criminal-
ized. Nor does this author think it should be criminalized. ELINT/CE
is a completely passive technology; there is no way to detect its use.
ELINT/CE leaves no tell-tale sign that it was used. If its use cannot be
detected then the ELINT malefactors cannot be apprehended. This
means that if it is criminalized, there is no way to enforce the law.
Criminalization could have an unintended effect of increasing the
94 We will ignore applicable security and exchange laws for the sake of simplicity.
95 United States v. Senditz, 589 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922.
96 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2510-2710 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
97 18 U.S.C.S. § 2510(1) (Law. Co-op. 1989); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2510(12)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
98 S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3555.
99 Id. at 3557.
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loss of information via ELINT/CE. If ELINT/CE is illegal then the
public may be led to believe (erroneously) that the threat has been dealt
with. This could lead to a false sense of safety. The public would not
purchase TEMPEST Certified equipment because the they would rely to
the law to protect them when, in fact, the law is incapable either of de-
tecting or stopping ELINT/CE. To explore fully the ramifications of
ECPA, the five previous hypotheticals will be used.
Hypothetical One. D1 eavesdrops on V's conversations by planting
a small radio transmitter on V's office. This would be a criminal act
under section 251 l(l)(a), which criminalizes the interception of oral
communication. Under 2510(2) the oral communication must have an
expectation of privacy. Since V's conversations took place within his V's
private office, Dl has intercepted an oral communication where there
was a valid expectation of privacy.
Hypothetical Two. D2 listens to V's phone conversation by physi-
cally tapping the wires of a common carrier. This would be a criminal
act under section 251 l(l)(a) criminalizing the interception of wire com-
munications. Under 2510(1) wire communication includes only wires be-
longing to a common carrier. D2 has intercepted the V's wire
communication using a common carrer.
Hypothetical Three. D3 uses a radio received to passively listen in
on a private radio transmission. He overhears private information ex-
changed between a politician and his mistress. D3 sells this information
to the National Enquirer. This would not be a criminal act under the
ECPA because radio transmission do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy.1 °" It is criminalized under the 1934 Act. 01
Hypothetical Four. D4 uses ELINT/CE to eavesdrop on the word
processor belonging to the senior partner in a mergers and acquisitions
firm. He uses this information to invest in the stock market."0 2 D4 has
committed no crime under the ECPA. The information was not trans-
mitted via a common carrier. Neither was the information transmitted
by radio.
As just demonstrated, there is no effective change for these hy-
potheticals between the original Title III and Title III as amended by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The ECPA does, however,
protect computer communications. This is especially important consid-
ering the large amount of information that is now transmitted by
computer.
Hypothetical Five. D5 listens to the information transmitted be-
tween two computers by physically tapping the wires of a common car-
100 United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23 (1st Cir., cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
101 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (hypothetical three).
102 For the sake of simplicity we will ignore applicable security and exchange laws.
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rier. This is a criminal act under section 2511(I)(a) which criminalizes
intercepting electronic communications. Electronic communications
means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, ra-
dio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photo-optical system.10 3 D5 has
violated the ECPA by eavesdropping on the electronic communication
between two computers.
It should be noted that the definition of electronic communication is
overly broad. It would, for example, include a person using his eyes (a
photo-optical system) to see neon sign (which by definition transmits in-
formation using a photoelectric system). The viewing of a sign could,
then, be a violation of 2511(l)(A).
This example illustrates the problem of trying to write legislation
that is broad enough to encompass future, unimagined, technologies. In
attempting to write a statute broad enough to encompass the unknown
technological future, Congress wrote one that was broad enough to in-
clude almost all communication. But, at the same time, they failed to
make it broad enough to include ELINT/CE.
Technology will always be years ahead of the law. Instead of writ-
ing an overly broad statute, Congress should have undertaken to amend
the ECPA twice every year. In this case, the definitions and language
would be written narrowly, not broadly. This would allow the statute to
pinpoint current technology without being over-inclusive. By amending
it twice a year, Congress would be able to apply the statute to new tech-
nological developments as they occurred, pinpointing the problems as
they developed." °
III. ENGLISH LAW
In England, the Home Office has set forth drafting principles con-
trolling how and why criminal legislation is created.' 05 Under these
principles, a criminal statute will not be written if there is a less onerous
way to address the problem. The statute will be written if and only if
criminalization is the only way to limit the targeted behavior.'06 "This
helps to maintain public respect for the criminal law." 107 The English
law, both existing statutory law and proposed law, adhere to these
principles.
103 18 U.S.C.S. § 2510(12) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
104 In arguing this, the author does not want to appear to be supporting the criminalization of
ELINT/CE. The author is merely advocating a legislative technique more in harmony with the ever
changing technological world than the technique currently in use.
105 THE LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPERS 1988, No. 110: COMPUTER MISUSE 1.11
(1988) [hereinafter THE LAW COMMISSION].
106 Id
107 Id
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Under the principles, a new offense may not be created unless it is
enforceable."' 8 To this end, the legislation must be "clear in its scope
and effect.""t 9 Further, criminal sanctions are "reserved for dealing with
undesirable behaviour for which other, less drastic means of control
would be ineffective, impracticable or insufficient.11 If tort law is an
adequate remedy, then criminal sanctions are prohibited. The behavior
in questions [must be] so serious that it goes beyond what.., is proper to
deal with on the basis of compensation as between one individual and
another and concerns the public interest in general." '
There are no computer crime offenses in England; the English do
not have a specific set of statutes aimed at crimes involving computers.
Instead, computer crime is dealt with in the same manner as traditional
offenses.11  "For example ... it is not a crime to use someone else's
lawnmower without their permission, so long as it is returned undam-
aged. By analogy, it is not an offense to make unauthorized use of a
computer."1 13
The Interception of Communications Act 1985114 criminalizes the
intentional interception of communications sent over public telecommu-
nications lines.115 The communications may be voice or data.1 16 The
Secretary of State for Home Affairs determines which communication
systems are part of the public telecommunications system.1 17
The interception of communications on a telecommunication line
can take place with a physical tap on the line, or the passive interception
of microwave or satellite links.1 8 It is not an offense to intercept coin-
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at % 1.5.
113 Id.
114 An Act to make new provision for and in connection with the interception of communica-
tion sent by post or by means of telecommunications systems and to amend section 45 of the Tele-
communications Act, 1984. Interception of Communications Act, 1985, ch. 56.
115 (1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a person who intentionally in-
tercepts a communication in the course of its transmission by post or by means of a public
telecommunication system shall be guilty of an offence and liable-
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years
or to a fine or to both.
Id. at § 1.
116 Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 4(l)(c); Interception of Communications Act,
1985, ch. 56, § 10 (1)(a) & (b).
117 Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 9(1).
118 Trespassatory eavesdropping is patently in violation of the statute.
The offense created by section 1 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 covers
those forms of eavesdropping on computer communications which involve 'tapping' the
wires along which messages are being passed. One problem which may arise, however, is
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munications if the eavesdropper has a reasonable belief that one of the
parties to the communication has consented. 119 In addition, it is not an
offense if the interception is done under a warrant issued by the Home
Secretary. 120 Nor is there an offense if the interception was done pursu-
ant to the provision of telecommunication service.'
21
The Communications Act of 1985 is roughly equivalent to U.S. law
as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.'22 Both
cover interception of communications whether transmitted by wire, satel-
lite, fiber, or microwave. The English law, however, is limited to com-
mon carriers; U.S. law has no such limitation. Neither law differentiates
between computer communications and voice communications; intercep-
tion of either is a criminal act. This means that the current law finally
protects computer communications.
The advantage of the English law over U.S. law lies in the method of
design. The English law was written by a group of academics and is
thereby mostly removed from the grip of lobbyists. The United States
was not so fortunate. ECPA, and its predecessors, were written by vari-
ous government officials, rewritten by lobbyists, and amended by politi-
cians. Where the English gave long and thoughtful analysis, the U.S.
effort was less reasoned.
ELINT/CE is not prohibited by the Act. The English Law Com-
mission is the authoritative body in England regarding legislation. It is
the official opinion of the Law Commission that eavesdropping on the
compromising emanations of computer equipment is not prohibited by
the Interception of Communications Act 1985:
There are... forms of eavesdropping which the Act does not cover.
For example, eavesdropping on a VDU screen by monitoring the radi-
ation field which surrounds it in order to display whatever appears on
the legitimate user's screen on the eavesdropper's screen. This activity
would not seem to constitute any criminal offense (unless the informa-
tion gained was specifically protected under, for example, the Official
Secrets Act 1911).123
In its official review of computer misuse 24 the Law Commission
the question of whether the communication in question was intercepted in the course of its
transmission by means of a public telecommunication system. It is technically possible to
intercept a communication at several stages in its transmission, and it may be a question of
fact to decide the stage at which it enters the 'public' realm.
THE LAW COMMIsSION, supra note 105, at § 3.30 (emphasis added).
119 Interception of Communications Act, 1985, ch. 56, § 1(2)(B).
120 Id., at ch. 56, § 1(2)(A).
121 Id. § 1(3)(A).
122 18 U.$.C.S. §§ 2510-2710 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
123 THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 105, § 3.31.
124 THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 105.
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evaluated whether English law was sufficient to deal with so called com-
puter crime, including ELINT/CE.125 The Commission, in its official
report, provisionally decided that the general criminal law was sufficient
to deal with most forms of computer misuse:1 26
In the light of our study of the present law, our provisional conclusion
is that the general criminal law is sufficient to deal with most of the
computer misuse which we have identified ... Our provisional view is
that a comprehensive computer crime statute is neither necessary nor
appropriate in England ... The present scheme of criminal offenses
relating to theft, fraud and criminal damage encompass a broad range
of factual circumstances and, in general, avoid distinctions based on
the kind of property stolen and damaged... Our provisional view is
that there is no reason to change this policy in relation to
computers. 12
7
[T]o justify legislative action and particularly the creation of any new
criminal offense, we believe that it is essential to be able to identify the
nature and extent of any risks involved. 128
The English decided not to add ELINT/CE to their Communica-
tions Act, or to include it in a computer crime bill, because they felt
ELINT/CE should not be a separate crime. The argument for inclusion
is that ELINT/CE, in and of itself, should be a crime. The English re-
sponse is that the act of eavesdropping may not be a crime but if someone
commits a crime with the information they will be punished. Since they
will already be punished for breaking the law there is no need for adding
an extra penalty for using ELINT/CE. For example, if D uses
ELINT/CE to obtain information about P and blackmails P then the
crime of blackmail has been committed and will be punished accordingly.
It is the resulting action that is punished. If the resulting action is not a
crime, goes the argument, then why make obtaining the information a
crime?
The American response is that anything bad should be a crime.
Since eavesdropping is by definition bad it should be a crime. This argu-
ment fails to address the intent of the legislation. Why was ECPA en-
acted? To limit eavesdropping. The goal of limiting eavesdropping?
125 In discussing the pros and cons of creating a hacker offense, the Law Commission noted:
A further argument against the creation of a hacking offense is that the offense may be very
difficult to enforce. We understand that it is possible for a hacker to obtain access to data
on a computer and to ensure that the fact that he has obtained access remains undetected.
Id. § 6.16.
126 Neither the English nor the Scottish law commissions have found sufficient evidence "of the
scale and consequences of computer misuse to conclude that it would of itself suggest an impending
crisis of a kind that demanded prompt legislative action." Id. § 6.18.
127 Id. § 8.2
128 Id. § 6.18.
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Protecting privacy. The English have a much better way to protect pri-
vacy. The English realize that criminalizing ELINT/CE and other
forms of data theft will not prevent the theft because data thieves are
rarely caught. The way to prevent the theft is shift the burden of the
person most able to protect the data: the person who controls the com-
puter. With this in mind, the English enacted the Data Protection Act of
1984.
Reducing Compromise of Data By Penalizing Those Who Fail To
Reasonably Protect Data
In England the Data Protection Act of 1984129 imposes sanctions
against anyone who stores the personal information13 of others on a
computer and fails to take reasonable measures to prevent disclosure of
that information. The act mandates that personal data may not be stored
in any computer unless the computer bureau or data user 31 has regis-
tered under the act.' 32 This provides for a central registry and the track-
ing of which companies or persons maintain databases of personal
information. Data users and bureaus must demonstrate a need and pur-
pose behind their possession of personal data.
The Act requires data users and computer bureaus to adhere to
eight Data Protection Principles.'33 The eighth principle requires the
129 "An Act to regulate the use of automatically processed information relating to individuals
and the provision of services in respect of such information." Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35,
preamble.
130 "Personal data" means data consisting of information which relates to a living individ-
ual who can be identified from that information (or from that and other information in the
possession of the data user), including any expression of opinion about the individual but
not any indication of the intentions of the data user in respect of that individual.
Id § 1(3).
131 'Data user' means a person who holds data, and a persons Holds data if-
(a) the data form part of a collection of data processed or intended to be processed by
or on behalf of that person as mentioned in subsection (2) above; [subsection (2) defines
data] and
(b) that person (either alone or jointly or in common with other persons) controls the
contents and use of the data comprised in the collection; and
(c) the data are in the form in which they have been or are intended to be processed as
mentioned in paragraph (a) above or (though not for the time being in that form) in a form
into which they have been converted after being so processed and with a view to being
further so processed on a subsequent occasion.
Id. §§ 1(5).
132 Id. §§ 4, 5.
133 Id. Schedule One.
Personal data held by data users
1. The information to be contained in personal data shall be obtained, and personal data
shall be processed, fairly and lawfully.
2. Personal data shall be held only for one or more specified and lawful purposes.
3. Personal data held for any purpose or purposes shall not be used or disclosed in any
manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.
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data users and bureaus to take security measures against the compromise
of personal data:
Appropriate security measures shall be taken against unauthorized ac-
cess to, or alteration, disclosure or destruction of, personal data and
against accidental loss or destruction of personal data. [In interpreting
the Eighth Principle], regard shall be had (a) to the nature of the per-
sonal data and the harm that would result from such access, alteration,
disclosure, loss or destruction as are mentioned in this principle; and
(b) to the place where the personal data are stored, to security meas-
ures programmed into the relevant equipment and to measures taken
for ensuring the reliability of staff having access to the data.134
The Act provides tort remedies to any person who is damaged by
disclosure of the personal data.135 Reasonable care to prevent the disclo-
sure is a defense. 136 English courts have not yet ruled what level of com-
puter security measures constitute reasonable care under the Act.
However, the courts have determined that due diligence is the same as
reasonable care.137 Due diligence is a question of fact.138  The failure of
company directors to exercise due diligence is imputed to the corpora-
4. Personal data held for any purpose or purposes shall be adequate, relevant and not
excessive in relation to that purpose or those purposes.
5. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.
6. Personal data held for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is
necessary for that purpose or those purposes.
7. An individual shall be entitled-
(a) at reasonable intervals and without undue delay or expense-
(i) to be informed by any data user whether he holds personal data of which that
individual is the subject; and
(ii) to access to any such data held by a data user; and
(b) where appropriate, to have such data corrected or erased.
Personal data held by data users or in respect of which services are provided by persons
carrying on computer bureaux
8. Appropriate security measures shall be taken against unauthorised access to, or altera-
tion, disclosure or destruction of, personal data and against accidental loss or destruc-
tion or personal data.
Id. Schedule One.
134 Id.
135 An individual who is the subject of personal data held by a data user ... and who
suffers damage by reason of - (c) ... the disclosure of the data, or access having been
obtained to the data without such authority as aforesaid shall be entitled to compensation
from the data user ... for any distress which the individual has suffered by reason of the
... disclosure or access.
Id. § 23.
136 "[I]t shall be a defense to prove that [the data user] had taken such care as in all the
circumstances was reasonably required to prevent the.., disclosure or access in question." Id
§ 23(3).
137 Riverstone Meat Co., Ltd. v. Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd., 1 Q.B. 536, 581 (1960).
138 Hammett (R.C.) Ltd. v. Crabb, 145 L.T.R. 638 (K.B. 1931).
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tion.' 3 9 Given the serious threat from ELINT/CE towards compromis-
ing information, due diligence must include the use of TEMPEST
Certified equipment.
There is no method to determine just how well the Act works. Data
theft leaves no fingerprints or broken windows. The data is just copied,
not removed so there is little evidence a break-in ever occurred. With
little chance to detect break-ins (a break-in would include acquisition of
data via ELINT/CE) it is impossible to determine the Act's success.
However, it is clear that a protected computer system must be
harder to acquire information from than a non-protected system. There-
fore, less data is being compromised now that systems must be protected
than before when systems were only haphazardly protected.
The United States has no similar law. Even if ELINT/CE was a
crime it would be impossible to detect its use. If it can not be detected
then ELINT malefactors can not be apprehended. This leaves data open
to anyone who can build a ELINT/CE unit. The plans for these devices
are available from the computer underground; 4° the parts to build one
cost less than two hundred dollars. This makes it very easy for anyone to
use ELINT/CE.
Only certain Department of Defense activities and federal investiga-
tory bodies use TEMPEST Certified equipment. It is not used by the
private sector. In fact, most security managers are completely unaware
of the threat. This leaves the door wide open to ELINT/CE operators.
At this time all detected computer break-ins come from some type
of direct access. The hacker, cracker, or phone phreak (hereinafter col-
lectively referred to as hackers) break directly into the computer. This is
accomplished either by breaking access security, or by intercepting com-
munications and stealing passwords. Because these methods require a
phone or network connection to the computer they can be traced. As the
police and FBI become more adept at tracking down computer hackers,
the hackers will shift to passive collection systems to obtain information.
ELINT/CE, the ultimate passive collection system, will become the
method of choice. It is cheap, efficient, undetectable, and best of all,
counter-measures.
139 Pearce v. Cullen, 96 Sol. J. 132 (Q.B. 1952).
140 There is no exact definition of the computer underground because, unlike the French Un-
derground of the Second World War or the Weather Underground of the 1970's, the computer
underground is not organized. The underground can best to termed as those individuals who are
operating outside the mainstream of accepted computer use. For a discussion of the computer un-
derground see J. BRUNNER, SHocKwAVE RIDER (1975) (fictional account). For a discussion of
what it means to be an individual and rebel against regimentation and thought control, see M.
WHrrE & J. AL!, THE OFFICIAL PRISONER COMPANION (1988). For a discussion of the eyberpunk
computer underground see W. GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1985)(fictional account); Markoff,
Cyberpunks Seek Thrills in Computerized Mischief, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
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IV. SOLUTIONS
ELINT/CE is a threat to keeping information secret. The most di-
rect way to prevent someone from eavesdropping on compromising ema-
nations is to prevent the emanations. This can be accomplished through
use of TEMPEST Certified equipment. The question then becomes, how
best to encourage the use of TEMPEST Certified equipment?
Criminalization is not the answer. ELINT/CE is a completely pas-
sive technology; there is no way to detect its use. ELINT/CE leaves no
telltale sign that it was used. If its use cannot be detected then the
ELINT malefactors cannot be apprehended. If it is criminalized, there is
no way to enforce the law.
Criminalization could have an unintended effect of increasing the
loss of information via ELINT/CE. If ELINT/CE is illegal then the
public may be led to believe (erroneously) that the threat has been
stopped. This could lead to a false sense of security. The public would
not purchase TEMPEST Certified equipment because it would rely to the
law for protection when, in fact, the law is incapable either of detecting
or stopping ELINT/CE.
If the goal is to limit the compromise of data the question that must
be asked in: how best to limit the loss of data? The answer is: make the
person who controls the data responsible for its protection.
The only way to prevent the loss of data through compromising em-
anations is to prevent those emanations. To limit compromising emana-
tions we must encourage the use of equipment that does not produce
them. This requires the use TEMPEST Certified equipment.
Businesses have no incentive to protect people's personal informa-
tion. It is in the business' interest to protect its corporate secrets, but
there is little incentive to protect information whose compromise will not
cost the firm lost revenues.
A disincentive must be created to make firms protect data. By cre-
ating a private tort between the person whose data was compromised and
the company, the Data Protection Act creates this disincentive. Should
the firm fail to take reasonable steps to protect the information then it
may be sued by the person whose data was compromised.
In deciding how much to spend on protecting such data the firm will
make an economic decision. The firm will balance its possible liability
under the Act with the cost of protecting the information. Should the
liability be high enough, the firm will invest in TEMPEST Certified
equipment. If the liability are not so high then the firm will choose to
use a more cost effective but less secure protection mechanism. In this
manner economic efficiency is achieved.
Implementing a U.S. version of the Data Protection Act will only
secure personal information held by firms where the cost of protecting it
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is less than the cost of leaving it unprotected. This does not address the
total spectrum of information that society might wish to protect. Each
person or company should be able to determine on their own whether
they want to protect information that is not covered by the Data Protec-
tion Act. This requires education.
The public is grossly unaware of the threat presented by
ELINT/CE. To solve this, government and industry must begin an edu-
cation program to provide information on ELINT/CE and TEMPEST
suppression. This will serve to alert computer users to the ELINT/CE
threat. Once aware, each computer owner can make his own decision
about the cost of compromise versus the cost of installing TEMPEST
Certified equipment.
To further this goal, all electronic equipment should be labeled as
either "TEMPEST Certified or as Emitting Compromising Emanations."
This will remind users of the security provided by the equipment before
they purchase it.141
V. CONCLUSION
United States law does not criminalize ELINT/CE. It was never
the intention of Congress to prohibit ELINT/CE, nor has Congress ever
discussed criminalizing the interception of compromising emanations.
The English Law Commission has addressed the topic of Compromising
Emanations. The Commission determined that ELINT/CE should not
be made illegal.
Criminalizing ELINT/CE in the United States is not an effective
way to prevent the compromise of information. Making ELINT/CE a
crime will serve only to give the public a false sense of safety because
ELINT/CE equipment is passive in nature and hence undetectable. If
the equipment cannot be detected then the malefactors cannot be caught;
and if they cannot be caught then the syllogism follows that they cannot
be tried or convicted. If the malefactors cannot be tried or convicted
then the law will fail to either deter or punish those who use ELINT/CE.
Under the English Data Protection Act data users and computer
bureaus must take reasonable precautions in protecting the personal data
they hold.14 2 Failure to take reasonable precautions will result in the
data holder or bureaus being liable in tort to those whose data was com-
promised. The use of TEMPEST Certified equipment is reasonable
where the possible liability in tort is greater than the cost of purchasing
141 TEMPEST Certified equipment must be modified every few years as surveillance devices
become more sensitive and the TEMPEST standard is updated. This is not a onerous burden, since
computer equipment has a very short useful life and is generally replaced/updated every few years.
142 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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the equipment. By balancing these economic interests the Acts achieves
economic efficiency.
The solution to ELINT/CE is to encourage the use of non-compro-
mising equipment, Le. TEMPEST Certified equipment. Only equipment
that does not emit compromising emanations is secure against
ELINT/CE. To encourage the use of TEMPEST Certified equipment a
two-pronged program is necessary. Prong one is the enactment of legis-
lation similar to the English Data Protection Act. This will force data
users and computer bureaus to determine which is more economically
efficient: controlling compromising emanations by purchasing TEM-
PEST Certified equipment, or paying out claims to persons whose per-
sonal information has been compromised.
Prong two is education. Only through education will the public be
able to determine whether TEMPEST Certified equipment is cost-effec-
tive for protecting their information. Once they have been educated
computer purchasers will be able to determine whether they need TEM-
PEST Certified equipment, and whether they are will to pay the high
price tag for security.
Christopher J Seline*
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve School of Law (1991).
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APPENDIX A
5/4/54/OS143
A 20707 NSA TS CONTL. NO 73-00405
COPY: D321
Oct 24 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Communications Intelligence Activities
The communications intelligence (COMINT) activities of the
United States are a national responsibility. They must be so organized
and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources in all
participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intel-
ligence requirements of all such departments and agencies.
I therefore designate the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Spe-
cial Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, which
Committee shall, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, establish policies governing COMINT activities, and keep me ad-
vised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council.
I further designate the Department of Defense as executive agent of
the Government, for the production of COMINT information.
I direct this Special Committee to prepare and issue directives
which shall include the provisions set forth below and such other provi-
sions as the Special Committee may determine to be necessary.
1. A directive to the United States Communication Intelligence Board
(USCIB).
This directive will replace the National Security Council Intelli-
gence Directive No. 9, and shall prescribe USCIB's new composition,
responsibilities and procedures in the COMINT fields. This directive
shall include the following provisions.
a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the Spe-
cial Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of
the new directive. Only those departments or agencies represented in US-
CIB are authorized to engage in COMINT activities.
b. The Board shall be composed of the following members:
(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the
Chairman of the Board.
143 This memorandum was originally classified TOP SECRET. It has been downgraded and
released to the author following a Freedom of Information Act request.
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(2) A representative of the Secretary of State.
(3) A representative of the Secretary of Defense.
(4) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
(5) The Director of the National Security Agency.
(6) A representative of the Department of the Army.
(7) A representative of the Department of the Navy.
(8) A representative of the Department of the Air Force.
(9) A representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.
c. The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive secre-
tary who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval
of the majority of the Board.
d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recom-
mendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the
following procedure, with respect to any matter relating to
communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction
of the Director of the NSA.
(1) The Board shall reach its decision by majority vote.
Each member of the Board shall have one vote except the
representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Central
Intelligence Agency who shall each have two votes. The
Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, will have no
vote. In the event that the Board votes and reaches a deci-
sion, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from
such decision within 7 days of the Special Committee. In
the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a decision,
any member of the Board may appeal within 7 days to the
Special Committee. In either event the Special Committee
shall review the matter, and its determination thereon
shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA and/or the
representatives of the Military Departments shall only be
filed with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
(2) If any matter is voted on by the Board but -
(a) no decision is reached and any member files an
appeal;
(b) a decision is reached in which the representative
of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and files
an appeal; no action shall be taken with respect to the
subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided
that, if the Secretary of Defense determines, after con-
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sultation with the Secretary of State, that the subject
matter presents a problem of an emergency nature
and requires immediate action, his decision shall gov-
ern, pending the result of the appeal. In such an emer-
gency situation the appeal may be taken directly to
the President.
(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance
with the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Sec-
retary of Defense. Except on matter which have been
voted on by the Board, the Director of NSA shall dis-
charge his responsibilities in accordance with his own
judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of
Defense.
(4) The Director of NSA shall make such reports and fur-
nish such information from time to time to the Board,
either orally or in writing, as the Board my request, and
shall bring to the attention of the Board either in such re-
ports or otherwise any major policies or programs in ad-
vance of their adoption by him.
e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling
within the jurisdiction of NSA;
(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence activi-
ties among all departments and agencies authorized by the
President to participate therein;
(2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and sub-
ject to the provision of NSCID No. 5, to supervise all ar-
rangements with foreign governments in the field of
communications intelligence; and
(3) to consider and make recommendations concerning
policies relating to communications intelligence of com-
mon interest to the departments and agencies, including
security standards and practices, and, for this purpose, to
investigate and study the standards and practices of such
departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting
COMINT information.
f. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the mat-
ters described in paragraph e above shall be binding on all de-
partments or agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the
unanimous vote of the members of the Board. Recommenda-
tions approved by the majority, but not all, of the members of
the Board shall be transmitted by it to the Special Committee
for such action as the Special Committee may see fit to take.
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g. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of the
Chairman or any member, and shall determine its own
procedures.
2. A directive to the Secretary of Defense. This directive shall include
the following provisions:
a. Subject to the specific provisions of this directive, the Secretary of De-
fense may delegate in whole of in part authority over the Director of
NSA within his department as he sees fit.
b. The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency (NSA) shall
be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the com-
munications intelligence activities of the United States conducted against
foreign governments, to provide for integrated operational policies and
procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this directive, the terms com-
munications intelligence or COMINT shall be construed to mean all pro-
cedures and methods used in the interception of communications other
than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts and the obtaining of infor-
mation from such communications by other than intended recipients, but
shall exclude censorship and the production and dissemination of fin-
ished intelligence.
c. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Secretary
of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who shall
serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be eligible for reap-
pointment. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the
armed services on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy at least 3-
star rank during the period of his incumbency.
d. Under the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with approved
policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA shall be responsible for accom-
plishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT collection
and production resources of the United States are placed under his oper-
ational and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the operat-
ing agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is
required, the Director shall normally issue instruction pertaining to
COMINT operations through them. However, due to the unique techni-
cal character of COMINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue
direct to any operating elements under his operational control task as-
signments and pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of
such elements to accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and
direct communication with, any elements of the Service or civilian
COMINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical
control as may be necessary, and he is authorized to obtain such informa-
tion and intelligence material from them as he may require. All instruc-
tion issued by the Director under the authority provided in this
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paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of
Defense by the Chief of Service or head of civilian department of agency
concerned.
e. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the following:
(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies
for the conduct of the U.S. COMINT activities.
(2) Conducting COMINT activities, including research
and development, as required to meet the needs of the de-
partments and agencies which hare authorized to receive
the products of COMINT.
(3) Determining, and submitting to appropriate authori-
ties, requirements for logistic support for the conduct of
COMINT activities, together with specific recommenda-
tions as to what each of the responsible departments and
agencies of the Government should supply.
(4) Within NSA's field of authorized operations prescrib-
ing requisite security regulations covering operating prac-
tices, including the transmission, handling and distribution
of COMINT material within and among the COMINT el-
ements under his operations or technical control; and exer-
cising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control,
including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance
with the regulations.
(5) Subject to the authorities granted the Director Central
Intelligence under NSCID No. 5, conducting all liaison on
COMINT matters with foreign governmental communica-
tions intelligence agencies.
f. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the
aims of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effective-
ness, the Director shall centralize or consolidate the perform-
ance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible. It is
recognized that in certain circumstances elements of the Armed
Forces and other agencies being served will require close
COMINT support. Where necessary for this close support, di-
rect operational control of specified COMINT facilities and re-
sources will be delegated by the Director, during such periods
and for such tasks as are determined by him, to military com-
manders or to the Chiefs of other agencies supported.
g. The Director shall exercise such administrative control over
COMINT activities as he deems necessary to the effective per-
formance of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of
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personnel and facilities will remain with the departments and
agencies providing them.
h. The Director shall make provision for participation by rep-
resentatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to
receive COMINT products in those offices of NSA where pri-
orities of intercept and processing are finally planned.
i. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose primary re-
sponsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective em-
ployment of the best available human and scientific resources in
the field of cryptographic research and development.
j. Nothing in this directive shall contravene the responsibilities
of the individual departments and agencies for the final evalua-
tion of COMINT information, its synthesis with information
from other sources, and the dissemination of finished intelli-
gence to users.
3. The special nature of COMINT actives requires that they be treated
in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelli-
gence activities. Order, directives, policies, or recommendations of any
authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection, production,
security, handling, dissemination, or utilization of intelligence, and/or
classified material, shall not be applicable to COMINT actives, unless
specifically so stated and issued by competent departmental of agency
authority represented on the Board. Other National Security Council In-
telligence Directive to the Director of Central Intelligence and related
implementing directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be construed as non-applicable to COMINT activities, unless the
National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to
COMINT.
/s/ HARRY S TRUMAN
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APPENDIX B
Introduction to Compromising Emanations
Intercepting the compromising emanations from electronic equip-
ment is referred to as ELINT/CE.14 With current ELINT/CE technol-
ogy it is possible to reconstruct the contents of computer video display
terminal (VDU) screens from up to a kilometer away; reconstructing the
contents of a computer's memory or the contents of its mass storage
devices is more complicated and must be performed from a lesser
distance.145
The reconstruction of information from CE is not limited to com-
puters and digital devices but is applicable to all electronic devices." 4
However, ELINT/CE is especially effective against VDUs because they
produce a very high level of EMR.147
According to the National Security Agency, which is charged with
144 The actual short name used by the National Security Agency to refer to ELINT/CE has
not been released. We will use our own short name: ELINT/CE. ELINT is the acronym for ELec-
tronic INTelligence and CE is the acronym for Compromising Emanations.
145 TEMPEST is concerned with the transient electromagnetic pulses formed by digital equip-
ment. All electronic equipment radiates electro magnetic radiation ("EMR") which may be recon-
structed. Digital equipment processes information as l's and O's - on's or off's. Because of this,
digital equipment gives off pulses of EMR. These pulses are easier to reconstruct at distance than
the non-pulse EMR given off by analog equipment. For a thorough discussion of the radiation
problems of broadband digital information see D. WHITE & M. MARDIGUIAN, EMI CONTROL
METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES, § 10.2 (4th ed. 1985). [hereinafter WHrrE & MARDIGUIAN].
"[E]mission levels are expressed in the time and frequency domain, broadband or narrowband
in terms of the frequency domain, and in terms of conducted or radiated emissions." Id. at § 10.1.
146 Of special interest to ELINT collectors are CE from computers, communications centers
and avionics. S. Schultz, supra note 31, at 181.
147 The picture on a CRT screen is built up of picture elements (pixels) organized in lines
across the screen. The pixels are made of material that fluoresces when struck with energy. The
energy is produced by a beam of electrons fired from an electron gun in the back of the picture tube.
The electron beam scans the screen of the CRT in a regular repetitive manner. When the voltage of
the beam is high the pixel it is focused upon emits photons and appears as a dot on the screen. By
selectively firing the gun as it scans across the face of the CRT, the pixels form characters on the
CRT screen.
The pixels glow for only a very short time and must be routinely struck by the electron beam to
stay lit. To maintain the light output of all the pixels that are supposed to be lit, the electron beam
traverses the entire CRT screen sixty times a second. Every time the beam fires it causes a high
voltage EMR emission. This EMR can be used to reconstruct the contents of the target CRT screen.
ELINT/CE equipment designed to reconstruct the information on a CRT screen intercepts the
EMR from the target's video circuitry. The synchronization (sync) signals from the target CRT are
normally too faint to be detected at a distance. Therefore, the ELINT/CE unit injects fresh sync
signals into the intercepted EMR. These sync signals are tuned until the ELINT/CE's electron gun
is in sync with the electron gun of the target CRT.
When the ELINT/CE unit detects EMR indicating that the target CRT fired on a pixel, the
unit fires the electron gun of its CRT. The ELINT/CE CRT is in perfect synchronism with the
target CRT; when the target lights a pixel, a corresponding pixel on the ELINT/CE CRT is lit. The
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protecting United States government communications and intercepting
the communications of other nations148, information... which is gener-
ated, processed, or transferred by electrical, electronic, and elec-
tromechanical equipments is subject to compromise because of
unintentional electromagnetic radiated and conducted emanations.149
Emanations which cannot be detected cannot be analyzed to obtain in-
formation; they are therefore not a security threat.1 50
exact picture on the target CRT will appear on the ELINT/CE CRT. Any changes on the target
screen will be instantly reflected in the surveillance screen.
For a thorough discussion of CRT ELINT/CE see Van Eck, supra note 32.
148 The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency (NSA) shall be to provide an
effective, unified organization and control of the communications intelligence activities of
the United States conducted against foreign governments, to provide for integrated opera-
tional policies and procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this directive, the terms
"communications intelligence" or "COMINT" shall be construed to mean all procedures
and methods used in the interception of communications other than foreign press and
propaganda broadcasts and the obtaining of information from such communications by
other than intended recipients, [] but shall exclude censorship and the production and
dissemination of finished intelligence... the Director of NSA shall be responsible for
accomplishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT collection and produc-
tion resources of the United States are placed under his operational and technical control.
Memorandum from President Harry S. Truman to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of De-
fense, 5-6 (Oct. 24, 1952) (establishing the National Security Agency).
This memorandum has never before been released to the public in its entirety. It is set out in
Appendix A.
149 NACSIM 5100A, supra note 145, at iii.
There are two types of emissions, conducted and radiated. Radiated emissions are formed
when components or cables act as antennas for transmitting the EMR; when radiation is
conducted along cables or other connections but not radiated it is referred to as conducted.
Sources include cables, the ground loop, printed circuit boards, internal wires, the power
supply to power line coupling, the cable to cable coupling, switching transistors, and high-
power amplifiers.
WHITE & MARDIGUAN, supra note 145, at § 10.1.
[C]ables may act as an antenna to transmit the signals directly or even both receive the
signals and re-emit them further away from the source equipment. It is possible that cables
acting as an antenna in such a manner could transmit the signals much more efficiently
than the equipment itself... A similar effect may occur with metal pipes such as those for
domestic water supplies ... If an earthing [grounding] system is not installed correctly
such that there is a path in the circuit with a very high resistance (for example where paint
prevents conduction and is acting as an insulator), then the whole earthing system could
well act in a similar fashion to an antenna ... [For a VDU] the strongest signals, or
harmonics thereof, are usually between 60-250 MHz approximately. There have however
been noticeable exception of extremely strong emissions in the television bands and at
higher frequencies between 450-800 MHz.
Potts, Emissions Security, 3 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 27 (1988). TEMPEST emanations are
assumed to be either direct baseband emanations, impulsive emanations, or double sideband ampli-
tude modulation. NACSIM 5100A, supra note 14, at 1-1.
150 Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm... in the form
of... disclosure.., of data. A threat is a potential for harm. The presence of a threat
does not mean that it will necessarily cause actual harm. Threats exist because of the very
existence of the system or actixity and not because of any specific weakness.
ADP SECURITY, supra note 13, at A-14.
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Detected emanations may be classed into two broad groups, those
that are correlatable (CORR E) and those that are non-correlatable.
Emanations which yield information after analysis are correlatable, those
that yield no information are non-correlatable. 151
Correlatable emanations consist of three sub-groups: Data related
emanations, compromising emanations, and undesired signal data ema-
nations. Data related emanations (DRE) are limited to correlated ema-
nations which are not compromising. That is, analysis of DRE will not
yield useful information."5 2 "Compromising emanations [CE] are unin-
tentional intelligence-bearing signals which, if intercepted and analyzed,
disclose . .. information transmitted, received, handled, or otherwise
processed by any information-processing equipment. 1 5 3
CE limits are set forth in NACSIM 5100A.'5 4 "[The] document
specifies test procedures for identifying the conducted and electromag-
netic radiation emanations characteristics of individual equipments in a
laboratory environment." 15' Equipments meeting the limits [set forth in
NACSIM 5100A] provide an acceptable degree of conducted and radi-
ated TEMPEST security at the equipment level." ' 6
The emanation limits [set forth in NACSIM 5100A, Appendix H] con-
stitute a set of reference curves which are intended for use:
a. As a guide for determining a contractual measure for accepta-
bility, or as a performance objective in preparing specifications for
newly developed equipments, and
b. As a standard to compare the TEMPEST profiles of different
equipments.1
5 7
CE above the limits set forth in NACSIM 5100A is considered un-
desired signal data emanations (USDE). l5 8
151 NACSIM 5100A, supra note 14, at 5-1.
In laymen's terms, correlatable emanations are ones from which information can be extracted
through analysis. To oversimplify, if your electronic typewriter puts out one type of signal when you
type "a" and another for "b" and so forth for all the keys, then these emanations are correlatable
because they can be used to determine what you were typing.
152 Id.
153 Id at 2-1.
In laymen's terms, compromising emanations that will yield information is analyzed. We used
an electronic type writer in a previous example; see supra note 153. The emanations in that example
were compromising because analysis would reveal what was being typed.
154 "Equipments and systems to which the requirements of this document are levied shall not
emit compromising emanations that exceed the applicable limits specified herein." NACSIM
5100A, supra note 14, at 2-1.
155 Id.
156 Id
157 Id
158 Id. at 6-3.
In laymen's terms, USDE are bad because they are strong enough to be picked up by
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Specifically, USDE includes electromagnetic radiation and BLACK
line[s]' 59 which exceed the applicable limits. "For RED signal line[s] ...
USDE refers to any portion of the measured signal spectrum which ex-
ceeds the RED signal line limits and from which the RED data can be
recovered." 160
Equipment that is tested and certified as conforming to NACSIM
5100A is referred to as TEMPEST certified equipment.161 Producing
TEMPEST Certified equipment is expensive; to encourage the availabil-
ity of off-the-shelf TEMPEST Certified equipment the NSA maintains a
list of equipment that is TEMPEST certified. When a government
agency or activity requires TEMPEST Certified equipment they may
purchase directly from this list rather than contracting to have the equip-
ment redesigned to meet NACSIM 5100A. 162
ELINT/CE surveillance equipment. If the signals are compromising but are too weak to be detected
at a distance they are not a threat-if they cannot be detected they cannot be analyzed.
This has led to a revision of the TEMPEST standard as detection equipment has become more
sophisticated. This could be considered akin to the arms race. As more sophisticated ELINT equip-
ment is built, the TEMPEST standard must be updated to limit CE below the limits the new equip-
ment can detect; as the TEMPEST standard is updated, installed TEMPEST Certified equipment
must be retrofitted to harmonize with the updated standard and new equipment must be manufac-
tured. As this happens, new and more sensitive ELINT equipment is built to eavesdrop on the
updated equipment.
159 Id. at 5-1. BLACK lines contain only enciphered information (cyphertext). UNrrED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: DATA NETWORK, BLACKER INTERFACE CONTROL DoCU-
MENT § 1.0.1 (1989)[hereinafter BLACKER].
160 NACSIM 5100A, supra note 14, at 5-1. RED lines carry plain text information. BLACKER,
supra note 159, at § 1.0.1.
Primary RED lines are those which intentionally carry RED signals. Secondary RED
lines are non-RED signals lines (clock, control) which originate or terminate in the same
electrical interfaces as or share the same cable with any RED signal line... RED Signal
Source [is] [a]ny circuit or circuit element, through which a RED signal is fed, which
causes a change in signal current with respect to time (di/dt).... RED Signal Type [is]
[t]he characterization of a RED signal by the following features: code, format, parity,
whether serial or parallel, whether repetitive or non-repetitive, the number of bytes simul-
taneously processed, and whether baseband or a form of modulation or multiplexing.
NACSIM 5100A, supra note 14, at 4-2.
161 The limits set forth in NACSIM 5100A apply solely to individual pieces of equipment.
TEMPEST certified equipment may produce USDE when placed with other equipment or
under certain environmental conditions. [This] may have a significant effect on TEMPEST
security when judged at the system or field-site level. Such considerations are beyond the
scope of [NACSIM 5100A].
Id. at 1-1.
162 Shearin, supra note 35, at 55.
The Industrial TEMPEST Program (ITP) was established to allow industry to respond to
Government's need for off-the-shelf TEMPEST equipment. It provides an alternative to
awarding specific contracts for each individual TEMPEST equipment required. First, a
company completes an ITP application indicating its intent to invest company funds in the
production of TEMPEST equipment and if the application is accepted, a voluntary agree-
ment called a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is signed which forms the corner-
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Information regarding compromising emanations is restricted.163
The information is available strictly on a need-to-know basis.
stone of the ITP. Once the MOU is signed and the company has met U.S. ownership and
security clearance qualifications, the ITP provides the National TEMPEST Standard and
other supporting documentation.
The goal of each ITP company is to combine its technical expertise with the classified
documentation to design an equipment that receives government accreditation and is listed
on the Preferred Products List (PPL). The PPL contains equipment which has met the
criteria of NACSIM 5100A and has been reviewed and approved by the TEMPEST Quali-
fication Special Committee (TQSC).
Id. at 56.
In April 1988 the National Security Agency's Industrial TEMPEST Program (ITP) was
restructured into the TEMPEST Endorsement Program which comprises the Endorsed
TEMPEST Products Program (ETPP), the Endorsed TEMPEST Test Services Program
(ETTSP), and the Endorsed TEMPEST Test Instrumentation Program (ETTIP). The de-
cision to restructure the ITP was based on increasing concern regarding the security integ-
rity of the products placed on the Preferred Products Lists (PPL). The new emphasis will
be individual product or service endorsement, vice company membership, and active in-
volvement of NSA technical resources in the evaluation and subsequent post endorsement
product assurance processes.
Letter from National Security Agency Public Affairs Office to author (Feb. 1990).
NSA endorsement is a statement that the company has successfully demonstrated to NSA
that its product complies with the requirements of the National TEMPEST Standard,
NACSIM 5100A and that the product manufacturer has in place and applies to the prod-
uct, the manufacturing capability and product assurance controls necessary to ensure the
continued TEMPEST integrity of the product subsequent to endorsement.
Id.
A new National TEMPEST policy, NTISSP 300, was enacted in October 1988. The thrust
of this classified policy is to provide government departments and agencies with a series of
options to solve their TEMPEST security needs. This new policy mandates that govern-
ment departments and agencies only buy TEMPEST protection proportionate to the secur-
ity requirements of that department of agency. It is anticipated that the policy will result
in a significant reduction in the overall cost of TEMPEST to the government.
Id
163 The Director, National Security Agency, has responsibility for providing guidance on
security classification and control of information pertaining to compromising emanations
including the releasibility of this information to foreign nations....
It may be necessary to assign higher levels of classification to specific categories of
compromising emanations information depending on such factors as: (a) the widespread
usage of a particular equipment or system used to process classified information; (b) the
geopolitical location of a specific operational site used to process classified information; (c)
the level or sensitivity of the traffic being processed by a particular equipment, system or
site; and (d) the severity of the [TEMPEST] problem associated with a particular equip-
ment, systemn or site.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY INFORMATION (NACSI)
4003: CLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES FOR COMSEC INFORMATION C-l, C-2 (1978)[hereinafter
NACSI 4003].
NACSIM 5100A is COMSEC (communications security) material. "Access by contractor per-
sonnel is limited to U.S. citizens holding final government clearances." NACSIM 5100A, supra note
14, at title page. NACSIM 5100A may not be disclosed or released by any holder without approval
of the "Director, NSA [or the] Chief, CSS [(Central Security Service)]." Id Nor may it be released
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Unclassified information concerning compromising emanations shall
not be discussed or made available to persons without a need-to-know,
especially when the aggregate of unclassified information could be
combined to reveal classified information. No person is entitled to
knowledge or possession of, or access to, information concerning com-
promising emanations solely because of his office, position or type of
clearance. 
164
Limited information is available to firms producing TEMPEST equip-
ment for the government. These firms must be owned by United States
citizens and pass a review by the Defense Investigation Service. 165 Con-
tractors are required to submit to prepublication review. 66 In addition,
they are discouraged from discussing TEMPEST with anyone, especially
the press.1
6 7
to foreign nationals without "PRIOR SPECIFIC APPROVAL FROM THE DIRECTOR, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AGENCY." Id. at i (emphasis in original).
164 NACSI 4003, supra note 163, at C-2.
165 TEMPEST information can be obtained either through a classified government con-
tract or under the auspices of the National Security Agency's Industrial TEMPEST Pro-
gram (ITP).
[D]istribution of [NACSIM 5100A] is made through the sponsoring agency's con-
tracting officer. The proper clearances and storage capability are obtained when the con-
tracting agency sponsors a company to the U.S. Defense Investigation Service (DIS), which
issues a facility clearance for the company and individual clearances for employees who
will be involved with the classified contract. When TEMPEST requirements have been
levied in a contract and clearances have been issued, classified TEMPEST information is
released to the contractor.
Shearin, supra note 35, at 55.
166 All TEMPEST assistance is rendered by the contracting agency, including technical
support and the prepublication review of any proposed dissemination of TEMPEST infor-
mation. The control and distribution of classified TEMPEST information is a contractual
requirement.
Id.
For a discussion of prior restraint and national security as they relate to the First Amendment,
see cases cited supra note 39.
For a general discussion of the First Amendment and national security, see sources cited supra
note 39.
167 "[W]e are very sensitive to TEMPEST exposure in the media, educational seminars, or
industrial trade shows... we must continue to work together... towards ensuring the inviolability"
of the newest frontiers of [TEMPEST information]." Shearin, supra note 35, at 75.
"[W]e challenge both Government and industry to restrict TEMPEST inquiries and informa-
tion to established classified channels." Shearin, supra note 35, at 55.
"No information related to compromising emanations shall be released for public consumption
through the press, advertising, radio, TV or other public media." NACSI 4003, supra note 163, at
C-2.
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